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Executive Summary
It is now widely recognised that, to be successful, efforts towards preventing and combating
the illicit trade in SALW will require a multifaceted approach which simultaneously tackles the
demand for and the supply of these weapons. In this regard, developing and promoting
international norms, standards and mechanisms for the effective removal of illicit weapons
from circulation is a major challenge for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.  
There are two distinct scenarios within which weapons collection initiatives operate: the
peace-time scenario, where efforts are focused on reducing criminal violence; and the post-
conflict scenario, where efforts are focused on the objective of conflict prevention through
peace-building.  
Experience of removing weapons from societies in the context of crime prevention is most
extensive in the Americas. In an effort to address the exceptionally high rate of firearm homicide
in Brazil, in 1999, a community development organisation, Viva Rio, has had considerable
success mobilising the population of its hometown and state and developing a good working
relationship with the authorities there. This has led to the collection and public destruction of
some weapons. Such weapons collection initiatives are often most effective not in terms of
the physical numbers of weapons collected, but rather through the success of complementary
efforts to raise the political stakes around the issues of gun control. 
Immediate disarmament post conflict:
In many situations, when armed conflict ends through surrender or settlement, it is essential
to disband militias, disarm their fighters, and redirect the latter towards peaceful and constructive
activities. In demobilisation centres set up for this purpose, ex-combatants surrender the
weapons they bring with them and are given clothing, food, money, official papers, training,
and/or other assistance. Collected weapons are often destroyed publicly, sometimes immediately
and on site. In those countries, such as Sierra Leone where destruction has not taken place,
this can pose significant risks. 
Voluntary weapons collection post-conflict:
In countries where the peace process has been formally wound up it is much more difficult to
retrieve the tools of war. Holders of weapons will be reluctant to disarm if they are disappointed
with the benefits of peace or sceptical as to how long it will last. The critical variable in this is
probably the extent to which weapons holders believe they need to retain their weapons,
raising the importance of measures to address the demand for SALW. Under the joint South
Africa-Mozambique Operations Rachel destruction programme informers are given rewards,
often cash, whose value is determined on the basis of such criteria as the value of the
revealed cache.  
Scenario 1:
Crime
prevention
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Executive Summary
Whilst the particular set of circumstances surrounding different weapons collection programmes
are likely to be, to some extent, unique, it is nevertheless possible to identify elements or
preconditions that are essential for any weapons collection programme to succeed. 
Tackling root causes:
The most important precondition for a successful weapons collection programme is to tackle
the root causes driving demand for SALW, inter alia through ensuring respect for human rights.
The success of all weapons collection initiatives will thus depend, to some extent, on the main
targets of the practical disarmament efforts having faith in assurances of security that are
provided by the state.
Existence of a stable peace:
The existence of a relatively stable peace will be crucial if former combatants are to be
persuaded to give up their weapons. Moreover, the compliance of former combatants is
essential, based as it is on a willingness to disarm and some degree of faith in the political
settlement on offer. 
Supporting measures:
Under conditions of relative peace, the two main success criteria are the support of the wider
public for measures to reduce the level of SALW in society, together with measures to control
access to SALW on the part of civilians.  
Sanctions vs incentives:
Also important is the need to balance the levying of sanctions and provision of incentives in
the construction of practical disarmament initiatives. Three criteria are important in this regard:
their effectiveness in accomplishing the immediate objective of disarmament, their contribution
to long-term programme goals, such as public safety and/or political stability, and their cost. 
Finance:
The issue of finance must also be addressed. It is clear that some modest level of financial
resources is necessary if people who hand in firearms are to be compensated. In post-conflict
environments, sufficient resources need to be made available inter alia for the construction
and staffing of the weapons collection sites and for the provision of cash or material incentives
to former combatants in exchange for the surrender of weapons.
The importance of destruction
The destruction of collected SALW should be considered an essential element of any practical
disarmament programme. Whilst destruction may not be strictly necessary in terms of the
collection of weapons per se in order for such initiatives to be self-sustaining, they must result
in the permanent removal of weapons from society.  
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Executive Summary
The draft Programme of Action, L4 rev.1, makes few direct references to the need for weapons
collection initiatives in their own right; an unequivocal statement of support for practical
disarmament initiatives in all their aspects is lacking. Accordingly, Section I (the Preamble) of
the ultimate Conference Programme of Action should:
l Explicitly recognise the role of weapons collection initiatives in the context of both
promoting post-conflict peace-building and in tackling violent crime; and 
l Establish clear commitments to promote and support the collection of SALW, in post
conflict regions and other areas where excessive or uncontrolled availability of SALW is a
major problem.
Section III – Implementation, international cooperation and assistance and Section IV –
Follow-Up should contain specific practical and financial provisions for supporting weapons
collection initiatives, for example, through:
l Establishment of a process for information exchange on experience regarding weapons
collection and for the promotion of best practice. 
l Establishment of systems to facilitate better co-ordination and mobilisation of assistance
for weapons collection (including clearer guidelines as to the types of initiatives that can
be supported by different international agencies, such as the UNDP, and regional
arrangements, such as the EU).
l Establishment of new sources of funding for particular aspects of weapons collection
(such as the small arms destruction fund that has been canvassed by the UK
government).
l Establishment of a mechanism for speedy provision of practical assistance and expertise
in order to carry out weapons collection and destruction, for example through the
establishment of a team of experts.
The UN
Conference
and the
Programme
of Action
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Introduction
Illicit2 small arms and light weapons (SALW3) can originate from many different sources. Some
are manufactured and traded illicitly from the beginning, however, most illicit weapons leak
from poorly managed government stockpiles, or are diverted from other legal end-users.
However, even if all sources of “new” illicit weapons were blocked with immediate effect, the
millions of SALW already in circulation that are outside state control are enough to ensure that
the illicit trade would continue for a long time, perhaps into the 22nd century. The permanent
removal of illicit weapons from society is therefore essential if effective progress is to be made
towards preventing and combating the illicit trade in and use of SALW.
It is now widely recognised that, to be successful, efforts towards preventing and combating
the illicit trade in SALW will require a multifaceted approach which simultaneously tackles the
demand for and the supply of these weapons. In this regard, developing and promoting
international norms, standards and mechanisms for the effective removal of illicit weapons
from circulation is a major challenge for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Opinions differ on how best to tackle the many aspects
of the illicit trade in SALW, but there is wide agreement on the need and feasibility of 
co-ordinated international support for the removal of illicit weapons from societies suffering
from their proliferation.
This briefing examines the issue of weapons collection4 from a practical point of view, setting
out some of the conditions that assist such efforts, and providing examples of different types
of initiatives that have taken place. By pointing to possible examples of best practice that can
inform future efforts in this area, the briefing makes recommendations as to how the weapons
collection issue can be addressed within the context of the UN Conference, the Programme of
Action and resultant follow-up measures. 
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Scenario 1:
Crime
prevention
Conditions for a Successful Weapons
Collection Programme 
One of the primary aims of any weapons collection initiative is to create or reinforce 
a government monopoly of the tools of violence. However, it is essential that such a monopoly
be balanced by the rule of law and respect for human rights and civil liberties. Indeed, such
“practical disarmament” is only one component of public security. When attempted in isolation
from other efforts to build security, it will typically fail. Unless the motives that drive people to
want firearms/SALW are convincingly addressed, they will be reluctant to give these up.
Attempts to forcibly disarm a population will typically heighten their desire for private
firepower. Accordingly, weapons collection efforts can only work in the context of a dual effort
to improve the capacity of the state to enforce the law, on the one hand, and to create
effective safeguards against the abuse of state power, on the other. 
Broadly speaking there are two distinct scenarios within which weapons collection initiatives
operate: the peace-time scenario, where weapons collection efforts are focused on reducing
criminal violence; and the post-conflict scenario where efforts are focused on the objective of
conflict prevention through peace-building.  
However, in some cases the distinction between political and criminal violence is blurred 
(e.g. in Afghanistan, Colombia, Northern Ireland and Sierra Leone) and communal violence
has been sustained through various forms of criminal enterprise. At the same time, violent
conflict of an ostensibly political nature can support illicit economic activity (e.g. in Albania,
Angola, Colombia and Sierra Leone). By the same token, many of the mechanisms
underpinning practical disarmament are similar, whether the aim is to fight crime or build peace. 
Despite the blurring of the line between politically and criminally motivated illicit weapons
possession and use, the objectives and methodology underpinning weapons collection
initiatives and the outcomes of individual initiatives will vary depending on the prevailing
circumstances, as shown below.
Experience of removing weapons from societies in the context of crime prevention is most
extensive in the Americas. Gun buy-backs5 are quite common in the United States. They are
typically organized and funded privately, often with the support of local civic groups and media
and with the assistance of local police and federal agencies such as the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). Although some initiatives have resulted in the voluntary surrender
of several thousand firearms, the liberal gun-control laws in the US mean that such efforts, in
themselves can have little impact on the huge numbers of weapons circulating. The principal
benefits accruing from such weapons collection efforts in the US thus relate more to the way
in which they help focus public attention on the problem of the proliferation and misuse of
firearms and involve local communities in working to address these phenomena. 
Indeed, despite a series of emotive and highly-publicised incidents of gun violence in the US,
including the 1999 school shootings in Littleton, Colorado, significant new restrictions in US
gun control law have yet to materialise. This is in contrast to the experience of the United
Kingdom following the killing of 16 primary school children in Dunblane, Scotland, in March
1996, and Austrailia following the killing of 35 people at Port Arthur, Tasmania, in April 1996,
prompted the governments of both countries to move quickly to remove firearms from society
(in Britain some 185,000 arms were surrendered, while Australians turned in nearly 644,000
weapons) and introduce tough new restrictions on their possession. The combination of
widespread public revulsion at the killings and consequent support for the tougher gun-control
legislation was instrumental in the success of the practical disarmament initiatives in these
countries.
Overview
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Conditions for a Successful Weapons
Collection Programme 
Where weapons collection efforts are perceived to have enjoyed a measure of success, they
have sometimes led to the establishment of similar programmes elsewhere. For example, the
Goods for Guns programme established by Fernando Mateo in New York served as a model
for the programme of the same name established in the Central American city of San Salvador.
Run by a coalition of citizens, businesses, NGOs, and churches called the Patriotic Movement
against Crime (abbreviated MPCD in Spanish), the programme has successfully drawn the
attention of politicians and communities alike to the need to reverse the proliferation and misuse
of firearms in the country. Unfortunately, as in the case of most US buy-back programmes, it
seems to have had little impact on the stock and flow of legal and illegal weaponry in El Salvador.
Similarly, in an effort to address the exceptionally high rate of firearm homicide in Brazil, in
1999, a community development organisation, Viva Rio, collected 1.3 million signatures in
support of an initiative to ban the sale of guns in Brazil. The organisation has had considerable
success mobilising the population of its hometown and state and developing a good working
relationship with the authorities there. This has led to the collection and public destruction of
some weapons. In collaboration with local authorities and others, Viva Rio has also set up a
comprehensive database which tracks registered guns which are legally sold as well as those
seized by the police. Viva Rio’s signature campaign and other lobbying efforts have placed
gun control squarely on the national legislative agenda with its emphasis on the establishment
of a strong base for gun control among citizens and local authorities. The inference from the
success of Viva Rio’s efforts is that weapons collection initiatives are often most effective, not
in terms of the physical numbers of weapons collected, but rather through the success of
complementary efforts to raise the political stakes around the issues of gun control. 
Immediate disarmament post conflict
In situations where weapons possession and use has been primarily politically motivated, the
first step towards disarmament of the factions can only be made when violence, including the
misuse of SALW, has been halted to a significant extent. The first step in the Northern Ireland
peace process involved ending the misuse of firearms – specifically, their use in sectarian
violence. This was achieved when the Republican and Loyalist militias announced and
maintained their cease-fires. While this did not put an end to all armed violence in the
province, its level was then low enough to allow movement to the next, more difficult stage of
the peace process.
With the guns more-or-less silent, the perceived need or demand for weapons had to be
reduced. Fundamentally, this could only be achieved by addressing the root causes of the
conflict. The Good Friday agreement of April 1998 represented an attempt to do this. Despite
this progress, however, since April 1998, progress on the ‘decommissioning’of weapons, as it
is called in Northern Ireland, has been extremely difficult. 
It seems clear that successful peace-building in the case of domestic political conflict, as in
Northern Ireland, must tackle all aspects of the weapons problem: use, demand, possession,
and supply. Some of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Central America have diverged
from this pattern only in the sense that use, demand and possession were tackled almost
simultaneously, within the framework of a UN peacekeeping mission.
Scenario 1:
Crime
prevention
Scenario 2:
Conflict
prevention &
peace-building
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Collection Programme 
The peace processes in African countries such as Liberia, Mali, and the Central African
Republic have involved a weapons collection component, with some degree of success. For
example, the Government of the Central African Republic, with the assistance of an African
peacekeeping force (Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui, M I S A B ) ,
conducted a weapons collection and confiscation programme in 1997 for the purpose of
recovering arms and ammunition looted from government stores in April-May 1996. Of the
more than 2,000 small arms, 100 artillery pieces, and several hundred thousand rounds of
ammunition taken, 95 percent of the heavy weaponry and 62 percent of the small arms and
light weapons were retrieved.  
In many such situations, when armed conflict ends through surrender or settlement, it is
essential to disband irregular militias, disarm their fighters, and redirect the latter towards
peaceful and constructive activities. Often, such disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration
(DDR) measures will also be needed for regular security forces. DDR considerably reduces
the risk of renewed civil war as well as the possibility that former soldiers and guerrilla fighters
will turn to armed banditry. In demobilisation centres set up for this purpose, ex-combatants
surrender the weapons they bring with them and are given clothing, food, money, official papers,
training, and/or other assistance in order to prepare them for a new life in the regular security
forces or civil society. Collected weapons are often destroyed publicly, sometimes immediately
and on site.  
In those circumstances where destruction does not take place, this can pose significant risks.
For example, from November 1999 to May 2000 an attempt at disarming rebel factions was
made by the Government of Sierra Leone with the assistance of ECOMOG and the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). According to the UN, 12,695 weapons and
253,535 rounds of ammunition were retrieved before the collection programme collapsed,
with the peace process itself, in early May 2000. Collected weapons were not immediately
destroyed, but simply disabled, thus facilitating their subsequent recapture by rebels after the
peace process had broken down.
Voluntary weapons collection post-conflict
The sequence followed in Northern Ireland or in countries where DDR programmes have
been undertaken, may not be appropriate in places like Cambodia and El Salvador where
excesses of weapons in society are linked to conflicts which have long-ended. In such
countries where the peace process has been formally wound up – the peacekeeping force
has left and ex-combatants are demobilised – it is much more difficult to retrieve the tools of
war. Holders of weapons will be reluctant to disarm if they are disappointed with the benefits
of peace or sceptical as to how long it will last. Disarmament can no longer be effected by
‘command’. The critical variable in this is probably the extent to which weapons holders
believe they need to retain their weapons, raising the importance of measures to address the
demand for SALW.   
For example, since 1995, the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Police of the
Republic of Mozambique (PRM) have undertaken a series of joint weapons destruction
operations, code named ‘Rachel’. Arising out of a March 1995 bilateral agreement on 
co-operation and mutual assistance in combating crime, the Operation Rachel programme
was launched for the purpose of destroying arms caches left in Mozambique following that
country’s civil war and transition to democratic rule. These weapons were generally believed
to be finding new markets among criminals in South Africa and contributing to that country’s
surge in rates of violent crime during its own, post-apartheid transition period.
Scenario 2:
Conflict
prevention &
peace-building
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The weapons caches are located on the basis of information supplied by local informers and
then destroyed on site by South African and Mozambican police specialists. Informers are
given rewards, often cash, whose value is determined by the team negotiating with the informers
on the basis of such criteria as the value of the revealed cache. Incentives such as clothes,
biscuits and sweets have been introduced as Mozambican women and children have become
more important sources of information on weapons caches. This non-punitive approach is
designed to encourage people to reveal weapons caches and to generate support for the
programme among local communities and the Mozambican people generally.7
In Cambodia, however, the weapons collection and confiscation programme was backed by 
a sub-decree limiting legal gun ownership to a thin stratum of upper-level government and
military officials. Although, as of October 2000, 66,309 small arms had been recovered, and
36,505 destroyed, the Cambodian weapons collection process has not been without its
problems. The failure to destroy all collected weapons and to close off new supplies of SALW
has meant that military-style weapons are still accessible to those who seek them. Yet, a more
fundamental limitation of the government collection programme is the present inability of the
Cambodian security forces (police, gendarmerie, and army) to ensure internal security and
uphold the rule of law. Accordingly, whilst most people are broadly supportive of the process,
many have been and remain reluctant to participate in it themselves so long as the state does
not ensure security for all people and communities.8
Finally, it is important to recognise that weapons collection and destruction programmes can,
in some cases, have a modest impact on the demand for SALW. Initiatives such as the Mali
“Flamme de la Paix”9 and the “Tools for Arms Project” in Mozambique10 have created very
different, yet visible, symbols of disarmament which can enter the public psyche, thereby
helping to generate the much-needed public support for practical disarmament initiatives.
From this discussion, it is clear that ‘disarmament by command’ operates within a particular
set of parameters, with the objective of facilitating the transition of a society from war to the
creation of a sustainable peace. At the same time, it is also possible to identify a number of
similarities between the objectives and circumstances surrounding voluntary weapons
collection programmes that occur some time after a conflict has ended, and those weapons
collection programmes that are conducted in a peacetime, crime prevention context.  Both
rely on the co-operation of individual firearm holders. Both offer positive incentives and
sometimes the prospect of punishment for non-compliance after an amnesty period. And both
have the same fundamental aim – to remove from society weapons that can threaten political
stability and/or public safety. 
Scenario 2:
Conflict
prevention &
peace-building
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Building International Action – Towards Best Practice
for Weapons Collection
The experiences of practical disarmament or micro-disarmament initiatives, particularly over
the past decade, constitute an extensive body of information relating to the conception, conduct
and outcomes of weapons collection programmes. Whilst the particular set of circumstances
surrounding different initiatives are likely to be, to some extent, unique, it is nevertheless
possible to identify elements or preconditions that are essential for any weapons collection
programme to succeed. 
Tackling root causes
As referred to above, the most important precondition for a successful weapons collection
programme is to tackle the root causes driving demand for SALW, inter alia through ensuring
respect for human rights. The experience of countries such as Cambodia has shown that, in
order for such programmes to significantly reduce the number of weapons in circulation, the
demand for SALW needs to be addressed. This will require the authorities to take steps to
assure the safety of civilians and former combatants alike. In circumstances where government
agents (be they police, military or paramilitary forces) are committing violations of human
rights, or where government is failing to prevent the commission of violence by non-state
groups, civilians and former combatants will be reluctant to surrender their weapons. The
success of all weapons collection initiatives will thus depend, to some extent, on the main
targets of the practical disarmament efforts having faith in assurances of security that are
provided by the state.
Existence of a stable peace
Related to this, in the context of post-conflict disarmament, the existence of a relatively stable
peace will be crucial if former combatants are to be persuaded to give up their weapons 
– a requirement which has sadly been lacking in Sierra Leone and other places. Moreover,
whilst ‘disarmament by command’ has been used to describe disarmament in the context of
demobilisation, the compliance of former combatants is essential, based as it is on a willingness
to disarm and some degree of faith in the political settlement on offer. 
Supporting measures
In terms of weapons collection under conditions of relative peace, the two main success criteria
are the support of the wider public for measures to reduce the level of SALW in society, together
with measures to control access to SALW on the part of civilians. Accordingly, the most
successful weapons collection initiatives in the context of crime prevention are those whereby,
as in the UK and Australia, public revulsion, following the commission of crime through the
use of SALW, led to the tightening of domestic gun control regulations and the simultaneous
removal of particular categories of SALW from society. In circumstances where weapons
collection efforts have either lacked widespread public support, or – as in the US – have failed
to be accompanied by increased controls on the supply of SALW, little progress has been
achieved in the longer term. Other supporting measures such as effective stockpile management
and enhanced legal and operational measures to block potential new supplies of illicit
weapons will also be important if the progress made in removing weapons from society is to
be sustained.  
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Sanctions vs incentives
Also important is the need to balance the levying of sanctions and provision of incentives in
the construction of practical disarmament initiatives. Three criteria are important in this regard:
their effectiveness in accomplishing the immediate objective of disarmament; their contribution
to long-term programme goals, such as public safety and/or political stability; and their cost.
Trade-offs between these criteria are unavoidable. For instance, offering attractive rewards to
firearms holders will usually boost the number of weapons collected, but is costly. Undesired
side effects may also result. Gun imports and thefts may increase as people without weapons
try to get their share of the rewards being offered. Nevertheless, incentives are essential to
voluntary disarmament. Clearly, what works best in the way of inducements will depend on
local conditions. One approach, which may work well under certain kinds of conditions, is to
combine weapons collection with development projects. It rewards and encourages the aff l i c t e d
community, rather than individuals surrendering weapons. Penalties for non-compliance are a
separate issue. If practical disarmament is part of a wider government effort to reinforce state
control over small arms, then citizens who fail to surrender such weapons during the relevant
amnesty period must be told, in advance, they will face legal prosecution.
Finance
The issue of finance must also be addressed. It is clear that some modest level of financial
resources will need to be available. For example the weapons collection exercise carried out
in Australia in 1997 saw AUD 320 million (USD 210 million) paid to those handing in weapons,
whilst the hand-gun surrender programmes in the UK in 1997 and 1998 saw the UK government
paying out just under GBP 90.2 million (USD 146 million) in compensation for returned firearms.
Furthermore, in order to maximise the success of weapons collection programmes in post-
conflict environments, sufficient resources need to be made available inter alia for the
construction and staffing of the weapons collection sites and for the provision of cash or
material incentives to former combatants in exchange for the surrender of weapons.
The importance of destruction
Finally, the destruction of collected SALW should be considered an essential element of any
practical disarmament programme. Whilst destruction may not be strictly necessary in terms
of the collection of weapons per se in order for such initiatives to be self-sustaining, they must
result in the permanent removal of weapons from society. Any collection initiative which does
not result in the destruction of surrendered weapons leaves the risk that some will re-enter
society. Accordingly, reducing the levels of illicit weapons in society will necessitate making
provision for their speedy and effective destruction.
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Weapons Collection and the UN Conference 
Programme of Action.
From the following discussion, it is clear that, in order to fulfil its principal objective of reducing
weapons stocks, practical disarmament must be supported by measures designed to strictly
control weapons supplies and reduce the demand for them. Furthermore, since successful
practical disarmament will tend to reinforce the state’s monopoly of force it must be
accompanied by safeguards against the abuse of this monopoly. In the specific context of
post-conflict peace-building, practice to date points to the need to link disarmament measures
to broader peace-building efforts, including development. In sum, practical disarmament can
only be effective where it is part of a broader, integrated strategy that addresses all major
components of peace and security in a given society.
In this regard, the UN Conference and ensuing Programme of Action have a critical role to
play in creating the conditions which can ultimately lead to the successful removal of illicit
SALW from society. Whilst the need to remove illicit/unauthorised weapons from circulation
may be a relatively uncontroversial issue the main debating points are likely to centre on: the
definition of the term “illicit”11 with respect to SALW; the necessity of destroying all collected or
seized SALW; and how the issue of weapons collection/practical disarmament should be
addressed.  
The draft Programme of Action, L4 rev.1, in fact makes few direct references to the need for
weapons collection initiatives in their own right. Rather, the practical disarmament issue is
embedded in references to the management and destruction of surplus or unmarked SALW
and the importance of DDR programmes, which are summarised as follows:
II. Preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small
arms and light weapons in all its aspects
National measures
16. expeditious destruction of any collected or seized unmarked or inadequately marked
SALW
15. destruction of all confiscated, seized or collected SALW unless another form of
disposition has been officially authorised
18. destruction of surplus small arms and light weapons using internationally accepted
and effective procedures
19. awareness-raising and confidence-building through public destruction events
21. develop and implement disarmament demobilization and reintegration programmes
At the global level
33. the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs to develop a reference manual on
ecologically safe methods of destroying SALW
34. to support disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-
combatants and the collection and destruction of surplus and illegally held SALW
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Programme of Action.
III. Implementation, international cooperation and assistance
14. to provide assistance in destruction of surplus SALW
16. to support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.
Building on the commitments in L4 rev.1
The above commitments represent a good basis on which initiatives to remove illicit and
surplus weapons from circulation can be built. However, an unequivocal statement of support
for practical disarmament initiatives in all their aspects is lacking. Accordingly Section I (the
Preamble) of the ultimate Conference Programme of Action should:
l Explicitly recognise the role of weapons collection initiatives in the context of both
promoting post-conflict peace-building and in tackling violent crime. 
Beyond this, Section II of the Programme of Action should:
l Establish clear commitments to promote and support the collection of SALW in post
conflict regions and other areas where excessive or uncontrolled availability of SALW 
is a major problem.
However, in the context of practical disarmament, the most important sections of the UN
Conference Programme of Action are Section III – Implementation, international cooperation
and assistance and Section IV – Follow-Up. Since operationalising the commitments within
the Programme of Action will pose significant challenges for all states, these sections should
contain specific practical and financial provisions for supporting weapons collection initiatives.
For example, through:
l Establishment of a process for information exchange on experience regarding weapons
collection and for the promotion of best practice. 
l Establishment of systems to facilitate better co-ordination and mobilisation of assistance
for weapons collection (including clearer guidelines as to the types of initiatives that can
be supported by different international agencies, such as the UNDP, and regional
arrangements, such as the EU).
l Establishment of new sources of funding for particular aspects of weapons collection
(such as the small arms destruction fund that has been canvassed by the UK government).
l Establishment of a mechanism for speedy provision of practical assistance and expertise
in order to carry out weapons collection and destruction, for example through the
establishment of a team of experts.
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Conclusion
The removal of unauthorised weapons from society is an essential part of preventing and
combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. The successful
design and execution of practical disarmament initiatives is, nevertheless, a complex and
multifaceted task requiring action to tackle both the supply of and demand for illicit weapons.
Accordingly, the UN Conference Programme of Action should seek to establish a process
whereby elements of best-practice for weapons collection initiatives can be identified and
operationalised. It should also establish programmes that provide for coordinated assistance
and the provision of technical expertise and support for practical disarmament measures. The
Programme of Action should provide for coherent national, regional and international action
on the range of supporting measures – such as responsible regulation of civilian possession
of SALW, a tight grip on sales and traffic, and effective control over government stocks of
SALW. These are necessary to ensure that weapons that are surrendered or confiscated do
not re-enter society and/or are not replaced by new supplies of SALW. Finally, but most
importantly, the Programme of Action must ultimately recognise and address those factors
that drive demand for SALW in all its aspects.
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